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INTRODUCTION
It is a privilege to be invited to deliver the Owen J. Roberts lec-
ture. My topic- -differences in the arts of judging on national and in-
ternational courts-is in fact only a few degrees of separation from
Justice Roberts's own career. Telford Taylor, a Chief Prosecutor at
the Nuremberg trials following World War II, wrote that he tried un-
successfully to have Justice Roberts nominated as the American judge
on that court just as the Justice was retiring from his fifteen-year tour
of duty on the Supreme Court. But as it turned out, the University of
Pennsylvania got there first. The alternate American judge at Nur-
emberg was U.S. Court of Appeals Judge John J. Parker whose nomi-
nation to the Supreme Court back in 1930 had failed by one vote.
And it was Owen Roberts who succeeded to that seat.' Justice Rob-
erts, of course, sat on several of the key war crimes cases of the 1940s,
such as In re Yamashita,2 where a Japanese general was tried before a
military tribunal and executed for the crimes committed by his
troops; Ex parte Quirin,5 the Nazi saboteur case; and Korematsu v.
This piece represents a written and updated version of the Owen J. Roberts Memorial
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United States,4 the Japanese-American internment case; cases which
still today are widely cited-as either justification or warning-in the
ongoing controversies about the government's current antiterrorist
policies.
Before beginning on that topic, I hasten to say that the judgments
and views I express here are in no sense universal (or even scholarly);
they derive from my own parochial experience which at least has the
virtue of vividness in recollection.
In 1999, I was nominated by the State Department and appointed
by the United Nations to serve a two-year term as the American judge
on the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
("ICTY") which was set up in 1993 to try and punish perpetrators of
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide committed dur-
ing the Bosnian War and later in the Kosovo campaign.5 I had at that
time completed over twenty years of service on the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The ICTY was a United
Nations court-the first international court since Nuremberg, which
was of course a military tribunal, albeit with many of the rights, rules,
and transparencies of an international court. The United States was a
prime supporter in money, personnel, evidence, and moral backing
of both the Nuremberg and Yugoslavia courts. It has been the
United Nations, however, who has had to pay the bills-now annually
more than $250 million 5-for the ICTY, located in the Hague; and it
is the U.N. General Assembly that elects the Tribunal's judges from
sixteen separate countries. The U.N. Security Council selects the
prosecutor. Slow in starting up, the Tribunal has now-after a dec-
ade-tried and, except for a handful of acquittals, convicted nearly
fifty Balkan civic and military leaders of serious violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law, better known as the law of armed combat or
IHL.
The Yugoslav court is now in an exit strategy under pressure from
the United Nations and is striving to close down by the end of this
323 U.S. 214 (1944).
See Statute of the International Criminal Tibunal for the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. SCOR, 48th
Sess., and Annex 1, 3217th mtg. at art. 2, U.N. DOc. S/25704 (1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]
(defining the scope of the tribunal), available at http://www.un.org/icty/legaidoc/index.htm
(last visited Aug. 27, 2004), adopted by S. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 1, U.N.
DOc. S/RES/827 (1993), available at http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1993/scres93.htm (last
visited Aug. 27, 2004), last amended by S. Res. 1481, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4759th mtg. at 1,
U.N. DOC. S/RES/1481 (2003), available at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions
03.html (last visited Aug. 17, 2004).
6 See R. Zacklin, The Failings ofAd Hoc International Tribunals, 2J. INT'L CRIM.JUST. 541, 543
(2004) ("[Tihe combined budgets [of the United Nations] exceed $250 million per annum
and are rising .... ).
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decade.7 There is a wide consensus among international law experts
that it has left an important legacy ofjudicial opinions and judgments
fleshing out the law of war, crimes against humanity, and the law of
genocide which, except for the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals af-
ter World War II and a few national court decisions in the interven-
ing fifty years, had never comprehensively been interpreted and ap-
plied by civilian judges to individuals accused of war crimes.
The ICTY and its sister court, the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda ("ICTR"), which was established in 1994 to try perpetra-
tors of the Rwandan genocides,9 have become the flagships for a fleet
of international courts created or proposed in the past few years to
deal with horrendous human rights violations committed during the
civil wars in Sierra Leone, the independence conflicts in East Timor,
the Khmer Rouge atrocities of the 1970s in Cambodia, and recently,
its record has been debated in the context of how to try the crimes of
Saddam Hussein. The ICTY also gave a strong kick-start to the crea-
tion in 2002 of the International Criminal Court ("ICC") after fifty
years of study and talk. The United States has in varying degrees
supported these attempts to internationalize justice save for the ICC,
which, after many years of active participation in its negotiation, the
United States now vigorously opposes.
Current debates on what form international justice should take
focus on whether countries devastated by war should be left to con-
duct their own prosecutions of war crimes. This is apparently what
7 See President Theodor Meron, Address to the United Nations Security Council (Oct. 8,
2003) (discussing how the creation of the War Crimes Chamber will help facilitate the the ICTY
completion strategy timeline as mandated by the United Nations Security Council), available at
http://www.pict-pcti.org/news-archive/03/O3Oct/ICTYd_lOO803.htm.
' See, e.g., Kelly D. Askin, Reflections on Some of the Most Significant Achievements of the ICTY, 37
NEW ENG. L. REv. 903, 907-10 (2003) ("The jurisprudence of the Tribunals is particularly rich
in regards to delineating, defining, and developing substantive crimes."); Symposium, The ICTY
at Ten: A Critical Assessment of the Major Rulings of the International Criminal Tribunal over the Past
Decade, 37 NEW ENG. L. REv. 865 (2003) ("This volume ... contains a dozen articles generated
by [a conference with the same title as the symposium], which we believe represent a significant
contribution to the literature about the Yugoslavia Tribunal and international criminal law and
procedure.").
' See S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) (es-
tablishing an "international tribunal for the sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for
genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the terri-
tory of Rwanda."), available at http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1994/scres94.htm (last visited
Sept. 16, 2004).
'0 See, e.g., Askin, supra note 8, at 913-14 ("The Tribunals have been accused of being too
expensive and having trials run too long."); Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and In-
ternational Security John R. Bolton, American Justice and the International Criminal Court,
Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (Nov. 3, 2003) (ex-
plaining the United States' reasons for opposing the ICC) (transcript available at http://
www.state.gov/t/us/rm/25818.htm).
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the United States favors for Iraq and what Iraq favors for itself." His-
torically, however, most strife-ridden countries have lacked anything
approaching adequate resources in terms of sophisticated, noncor-
ruptjudges and prosecutors trained in the laws of war, as well as the
expert technicians needed for collection and maintenance of evi-
dence in the field, mass exhumations, and expensive witness proto-
cols. And frequently there are people in those countries still in lead-
ership positions who are loyal to the "homeland heroes" on trial who
sought to disrupt or even corrupt the judicial process. After a dec-
ade, war crime prosecutions grew in numbers in Serbian, Croatian,
and Bosnian national courts, but there remains much skepticism
among international observers and among victims' groups about the
fairness of the trials and the impartiality of the verdicts. The Indone-
sian domestic prosecutions of military officials who reportedly spear-
headed the East Timor massacres in 2000 have mostly resulted in ac-
quittals; prosecution witnesses have reportedly been intimidated;
little or no protection has been accorded by the court; and prosecu-
tors have been suspiciously docile in pushing their cases. The sen-
tences imposed on the few found guilty of any crime have been ab-
surdly low. 12 So far, then, there is little proof that countries racked by
war, tyranny, and poverty can effectively and fairly punish the worst
violators of their citizens' human rights. The victims, primarily inno-
cent and powerless women and children, are often left without re-
13course.
Some, of course, say that the criminal trial model is the wrong one
and that the advent of truth and reconciliation commissions, begin-
ning with South Africa in the post-apartheid period, offer greater
hope of diffusing tensions and animosities and encouraging perpe-
trators to confess when community-service-type punishments are sub-
stituted for trials and prison. But here too, the experience is mixed.
" See Frank J. Murray, US. Will Prosecute Iraqis for War Crimes, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2003, at
A01 (reporting that atrocities would be prosecuted in Iraqi courts under an "Iraqi-led process
that will bring justice for the years of abuses") (quoting U.S. Ambassador for War Crimes Pierre-
Richard Prosper), available at 2003 WL 7709079.
12 Eighteen political and military leaders in Jakarta were charged only with failing to prevent
violence, though the Indonesian Human Rights Commission and international observers re-
ported that those same leaders had orchestrated the violence. See DAVID COHEN, INTENDED TO
FAIL: THE TRIALS BEFORE THE AD Hoc HUMAN RIGHTS COURT INJAKARTA (Int'l Center for Tran-
sitional Justice, ed. 2003) (discussing Indonesia's failures to deliver justice to war crime perpe-
trators), available at http://ist-socrates.berkeley.edu/-warcrime/EastTimor_andIndonesia/
Reports/IntendedtoFail.pdf.
" But see INDONESIAN JUDGES SEMINAR ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW,
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2 (Univ. of Calif. Berkeley War Crimes Studies Ctr. et al.
eds., 2003) ("[I]t is important to recognize that there are significant variations in the quality
and performance of the different Ojudicial] panels.... In the face of... obstacles, many of the




The South African commission ended primarily with mid-level rather
than top leaders participating, and throughout the process it wielded
a threat of criminal investigations and prosecution if the penitent did
not admit to the full scope of his wrongdoing. 4 In some countries,
like Serbia, the commissions have been failures, never winning the
confidence of the people or engaging major perpetrators," and in
some, like Sierra Leone, the commissions have operated on a parallel
track alongside criminal tribunals that try the worst violators, leaving
to the commissions the truth-finding functions as to the deeds of mid-
dle- or lower-level perpetrators.
So it appears that unless a country or the international community
decides to bypass altogether the terrible crimes of war or against hu-
manity, some form of international courts will be empowered for
some time to come. The ICC, with its worldwide potential jurisdic-
tion, already operates without the United States' help. This reality
sets the stage for my main topic today-the differences between judg-
ing nationally and internationally. There are now some three hun-
dred international judges serving in fifty international courts around
the globe (some on civil rather than criminal courts), and I expect
that American judges, despite our rejection of the ICC, will continue
to have significant representation in this group as a whole. It thus
makes sense to considerjust whatjudging on an international court is
about and how the processes may be improved to make that experi-
ence more rewarding and productive. I do not pretend to have an
intimate knowledge of all international courts, but I draw on my own
experience as a judge on one major international tribunal and on my
later work with legal programs abroad.
I. SELECTION AND TENURE OF INTERNATIONALJUDGES
How to pick judges is a major issue inside democratic countries
walking the fine line between assuring judicial independence and
impartiality and governing according to the will of the people. Even
we Americans-it is widely conceded-have not yet gotten it entirely
right. Independence-oriented critics deplore the pressures imposed
by direct election of the high court judges in a majority of states, and
"4 See Helena Cobban, The Legacies of Collective Violence, BOSTON REV., April/May 2002 (draw-
ing preliminary lessons learned from the ICC), http://bostonreview.mit.edu/BR27.2/
cobban.html; Ginger Thompson, South African Commission Ends Its Work, N.Y. TIMES, March 22,
2003, at A5 ("But almost since its beginning, the commission's work has been blocked by legal
obstacles, raised by some of the high-level officials it aimed to expose, and dogged by disap-
pointment from the people it aimed to lift from obscurity.").
'5 See Daniel Williams, A Faint Path to Truth in Serbia, WASH. POST, July 5, 2002, at A12 ("It is
hard to find people in Belgrade who view the commission as a vehicle for coming to terms with
the wars and Serbia's role in them.").
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democracy-oriented critics are constantly reminding us of the unac-
countability of life-tenured federal judges who they say are too often
free to follow their own preferences rather than "the law" or the pub-
lic's will. '6 Our Constitution, of course, bestows that life tenure on
the President's federal court nominees subject to confirmation by a
majority of the Senate and to the judges' continuing good behavior.
1 7
But any first-year law student knows that is not the whole story. The
President nominates men and women he believes will rule in accor-
dance with his party's basic philosophy (historically over ninety per-
cent have been chosen from the President's party). The principle
check on his discretion is whether he believes they will be confirmed
by a mixed-party Senate or, as we have recently seen, their nomina-
tions may be stalled or filibustered in response to campaigns by mobi-
lized groups of voters who oppose the nominee's past record or pre-
dicted future judicial stance. The nominee must appear before the
Senate Judiciary Committee and parry questions in a way that does
not taint his future independence in specific cases but yet seems re-
sponsive. (I myself had a somewhat anxious confirmation back in
1979 as a number of right-wing groups attacked me as anti-family for
my work on the rights of juveniles. Fortunately, my five kids showed
up at the hearings to blunt that challenge.)
One thing that can be praised in our process, however, is its
transparency; if the President tries to sneak in too extreme a nomi-
nee, he is likely to provoke a fateful and sometimes fatal opposition.
Usually, however, we can count on the public nature of the proceed-
ings to insure that judicial candidates meet minimum qualifications
of intelligence, experience, objectivity, and ability to render fair
judgments. Most agree that judges are-and ought to be-picked
not just for technical skills in finding what law reposes on library
" See, e.g., CALL TO ACTION: STATEMENT OF THE NATIONAL SUMMIT ON IMPROVING JUDICIAL
SELECTION 1 (Nat'l Ctr. for St. Cts. ed., 2001) [hereinafter CALL TO ACTrION] (laying out reform
recommendations for partisan elections and terms of elective office, judicial election campaign
conduct, voter awareness and participation in judicial elections, and campaign finance in judi-
cial election campaigns), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/
ResJudSelCallToActionPub.pdf (last modified Mar. 11, 2002);JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE
CROSSROADS (Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman, eds., 2002) (exploring the theory and
meaning of judicial independence as it relates to various sources of pressure); OFFICE OF
DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE, U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEV., TECH. PUB. SERIES No. PN-ACM-
007, GUIDANCE FOR PROMOTING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND IMPARTIALITY (rev. ed. 2002)
[hereinafter GUIDANCE], available at http://www.usaid.gov/our-.work/democracyand_
governance/publications/pdfs/pnacm007.pdf; UNCERTAIN JUSTICE: POLITICS AND AMERICA'S
COURTS: THE REPORTS OF THE TASK FORCES OF CITIZENS FOR INDEPENDENT COURTS (The Con-
stitution Project ed., 2000) [hereinafter UNCERTAIN JUSTICE] (collecting reports prepared by a
series of task forces created to focus on the federal judicial selection, the selection of state court
judges, the distinction between intimidation and legitimate criticism ofjudges, and the role of
the legislature in setting the power and jurisdictions of the courts).
" U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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shelves (or in the computer), but for proven integrity, their reflection
of the broader values and commitments of the society in their deci-
sions, and their ability rightfully to predict the consequences of their
decisions most of the time.
Judges selected for international courts get there by a different
route. Telford Taylor's account of how the Nuremberg judges were
chosen and how they performed is both an instructive and fascinating
study in realpolitik. l Robert Jackson, already selected as Chief Prose-
cutor by President Truman, felt free to recommend names for the
American judge and alternate judge on the court.20 Truman ulti-
mately picked Francis Biddle, who had recently resigned as Franklin
D. Roosevelt's Attorney General, as the American judge, in part be-
cause Truman felt guilty about forcing Biddle's resignation; and he
picked John J. Parker, years earlier rejected for the Supreme Court,
as the alternate, as a favor to James Byrnes, then Secretary of State, a
fellow Carolinian.2 ' Biddle was an enthusiastic recruit for the Nur-
emberg Tribunal although he had little judicial experience, having
served only a few discontented months as a federal circuit judge,
while Parker went reluctantly citing his "comfortable well-defined
life" on the Fourth Circuit and his fear that, as a mere alternate
judge, he would be a "voteless cipher."22 In the end, Taylor thought
Biddle was smart but "impatient, often caustic, did not suffer fools
gladly and could never have projected the aura of fairness that [the
British judge who was selected President of the Court over Biddle]
radiated. 2 3 On the other hand, Taylor thought Parker was "the wisest
head in the room" due largely to his long judicial experience at
home.24 Taylor found the entire Nuremberg panel "not a brilliant
group. But their work was professional, honest, and did no discredit
to the heavy task that was set before them.,'
25
Fifty years later, when it came time to choose the fourteen judges
for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,
the only requirements laid down in its enabling statute, contained in
a Security Council Resolution, were that they be selected by the U.N.
General Assembly from among "persons of high moral character, im-
" See, RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY (2003) ("This book argues
for a theory of pragmatic liberalism the twin halves of which are a pragmatic theory of democ-
racy and a pragmatic theory of law."); UNCERTAIN JUSTICE, supra note 16, at 7 (recommending
executive and legislative reviewing process pertaining to ideology for the selection of federal
judges).




" Id. at 226.
24 Id. at 632.
25 Id.
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partiality and integrity who possess the qualifications required in
their respective countries for appointment to the highest judicial of-
fices. 2 6 How those aspirational criteria would be applied was left to
each country's discretion, although informally it was acknowledged
that the judges must represent a wide geographical span as well as
different legal cultures, and they must include, if so desired, repre-
sentatives of the "big five" on the Security Council-the United
States, the United Kingdom, Russia, France, and China.
Thus, the opening roster of the Yugoslav Tribunal included eleven
judges from the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Nigeria,
France, China, Costa Rica, Pakistan, Malaysia, Italy, and Australia. Al-
though the ICTY statute said "due account shall be taken of the ex-
perience of the judges in criminal law, international
law, ... international humanitarian law and human rights law, 27 the
results of the General Assembly elections more accurately reflected
geographical and cultural diversity than judicial experience. United
Nations officials readily admit that they have never felt free to over-
ride member countries' nominees on their candidates' individual
merits, and although negotiations go on among member countries as
to whose candidates they will support, they do not generally focus on
individual qualifications as much as regional concerns and non-
judicial areas of mutual interest. Many of the ICTYjudges in the be-
ginning were former diplomats and scholars without courtroom ex-
perience of any kind; a few were quite old and even infirm (one Chi-
nese judge was ninety); and there was a decided mix of able,
experienced jurists and criminal law neophytes. Until 2001, when a
corps of ad litemjudges was added to sit on one or two trials apiece to
clear the docket, there were never more than three female judges on
what grew to be a sixteen-person court. (I do note that two of three
U.S. judges have been women.) In my experience, this mode of se-
lection left a cluster of hardworking, experienced judges to bear the
laboring oar for the substantive work of the Tribunal, particularly the
writing of judgments; in other perforce chambers the legal assistants
did much of that work. And when a judge unfamiliar with the trial
process was assigned to preside over a three-judge panel, the trials
frequently took longer than they might have otherwise.5  Occasion-
ally, too, reversible errors were committed, inappropriate questions
ICTY Statute, supra note 5, at art. 13.
27 Id.
Trials at the Tribunal have generally been criticized as too long, consuming in the begin-
ning years an average of over a year with several (leaving Milosevic aside) taking two years. See
Justice in the Balkans: Hague Tribunal Sets a Valuable Precedent, GUARDIAN (London) Aug. 6, 2001,
at 17 ("The Tribunal has often seemed to proceed at snail's pace, delayed by the complexities
of evidence gathering and its judges' inexperience as much as by difficulties in apprehending
suspects."). But seeAskin, supra note 8, at 913-14 (noting that most trials average nine months).
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were asked, and uninformed rulings were made from the bench.
However, I hasten to add that I saw no case in which the fundamental
rights of the accused were impugned which did not eventually get
righted. It was more a case of efficiency than ultimate fairness. Per-
haps because ICTY jurisdiction was limited to criminal cases that
arose from the Bosnian and Kosovo conflicts, there were few ideo-
logical quarrels among the judges; but there were a myriad of legal
and interpretive disputes about the content of international law as
well as the requirements of procedural fairness in a criminal trial.
When such questions arose, it was sometimes difficult to conduct a
constructive dialogue between those who were intimately familiar
with some form of the criminal trial process and those who were not.
Other international courts have encountered such problems as
well and are considering reforms in the selection process. Judicial se-
lection at the European Court of Human Rights, a creature of the
Council of Europe which has jurisdiction over forty-five signatory
countries to the European Convention on Human Rights in that re-
gion, is a topic of current controversy. A report by the International
Centre for the Legal Protection of Human Rights ("INTERIGHTS")
warns that: "[The court's] credibility and authority risk being un-
dermined by the ad hoc and often politicized processes currently
adopted in the appointment of its judges."29 The complaints are not
dissimilar to the charges leveled at the ICTY process: lack of visibility
or guidelines for the in-country nomination process. According to
the INTERIGHTS report, a candidate's success more "often rewards
political loyalty... than merit. 0 0 And when the Council of European
Parliamentary Assembly makes final picks from the various countries'
nominees, the individuals are only cursorily assessed in fifteen-minute
interviews, and no reasons are given for the ultimate choices.3' The
complaint resurfaces that there needs to be more emphasis on judi-
cial experience in addition to familiarity with international law. With
the growing number of European countries subject to the European
Court of Human Rights, there is also apprehension that member
countries sometimes try to exert pressure on their representatives to
rule in their favor; the brevity of the judges' terms along with their
eligibility for re-election intensifies that pressure. %
There is much at stake. International courts risk vital loss of
credibility if their judges are perceived as representatives of their
INT'L CTR. FOR THE LEGAL PROT. OF HUMAN RIGHTS ("INTERIGHTS"), JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE: LAW AND PRACTICE OF APPOINTMENTS TO THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 4 (2003), available at http://www.interights.org/news/English%20Report.pdf (last vis-
ited Sept. 17, 2004).
3o Id.
Id. at 4-5.
2 Id. at 24-25.
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homelands rather than as independent judges construing and apply-
ing tenets of international (or regional) law. Some critics of interna-
tional courts, like my former colleague Robert Bork, express outright
skepticism that any judge can be expected to rise above, or rule
against, the interests of her native land.3  My own experience and the
record of some American judges on the International Court ofJustice
at the Hague, which hears cases brought by one state against another,
does not bear out that harsh assessment.3 4 One commentator, how-
ever, has suggested that there should be an international corps of
judges who rotate service in more than one tribunal and become true
internationalists; in their varied experience they would also, hope-
fully, transfer the best practices from one tribunal to another. 
5
A special note should be made as to the unique situation ofjudges
in the newer international "hybrid courts"-Sierra Leone, Kosovo,
East Timor, and Cambodia-where the country most involved in the
war crimes selects a majority of judges, but several international
judges, usually chosen by the United Nations, are added for credibil-
ity and expertise in international law.3 6 For varied reasons, this hybrid
model, rather than the Yugoslav and Rwanda models, may be the
wave of the future. On these hybrid courts the international judges
carry an even heavier responsibility for ensuring impartiality and con-
formity with international standards of fairness and consistent inter-
pretation of international law; accordingly, their selection requires
33 ROBERT H. BORK, COERCING VIRTUE: THE WORLDWIDE RULE OFJUDGES 41 (2003) ("[O]ne
must wonder whether an international tribunal can ever be entirely free of the foreign policy
interests of the nations whose jurists sit on the tribunal.").
See, e.g., Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. United States),
2003 I.C.J. 128 (Order of Feb. 5) (unanimously ordering provisional measures against the U.S.
in a case concerning the rights of capital defendants in the U.S. to access Mexican diplomatic
officials before execution), available at http://www.icj-ci.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imus
order/imts_iorder_-20030205.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2004).
" William W. Burke-'White, A Community of Courts: Toward a System of International Criminal
Law Enforcement, 24 MICH.J. INT'L L. 1, 95-97 (2002).
' See, e.g., Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea arts.
10-11, REACH KRAM NO. NS/RKM/0801/12 (2001) (Cambodia) (permitting the U.N. to nomi-
nate up to twelve foreign judges), available at http://www.yale.edu/cgp/KRLaw_
trans.06.09.2001.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2004); Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone
art. 12 (2002) (Sierra Leone) (requiring two judges for the Trial Chamber and three judges for
the Appeals chamber to be selected by the Secretary-General of the United Nations), available at
http://www.specialcourt.org/documents/SpecialCourtStatuteFinal.pdf (last visited Sept. 17,
2004); On the Establishment of the Administrative Department of Education and Science, U.N. Interim
Admin. Mission in Kosovo ("UNMIK") Reg. 2000/64, at § 4(c), U.N. Doc.
UNMIK/REG/2000/64 (requiring heads of the department to "ensure that all recruitment is
based on professional qualifications, competence and merit"); On the Organization of Courts in
East Timor, U.N. Transitional Admin. in E. Timor ("UNTAET") Reg. 2000/11, at § 10.3, U.N.
Doc. UNTAET/REG/2000/11 (specifying organizational requirements for courts in East Timor




even greater attention to their experience in the courtroom and to
their record as strong and independent jurists. International non-
governmental organizations ("NGOs") (nongovernmental advisory
bodies interested in human rights and international justice), which
have taken an acute interest in these hybrid courts, are already work-
ing with in-country NGOs in Cambodia, for instance. These coun-
tries are expected to make the major financial contribution to that
tribunal in an effort to assure that the best and least Khmer-Rouge-
affiliated Cambodian judges are chosen, and that truly competent in-
ternational judges complement them. There is additionally an inter-
esting provision in the Cambodian Extraordinary Chambers law that
no decision can be reached without the consensus of at least one in-
ternational judge ."
The drafters of the Rome Statute, creating the new International
Criminal Court,8 drew on lessons from earlier international courts in
setting the rules for selection of judges. Article thirty-six of the Rome
Statute sets out the usual formula that the judges must be "persons of
high moral character, impartiality and integrity who possess the quali-
fications required in their respective states for appointment to the
highest judicial offices. '3 9 But it goes further to require that every ju-
dicial candidate has established either competence in criminal law
and procedure and relevant experience as judge, prosecutor, or ad-
vocate in criminal proceedings, or competence in international hu-
manitarian law and human rights and extensive experience in a pro-
fessional legal capacity relevant to the judicial work of the court.
40
The nomination procedures in the individual states that are parties to
the statute must be either those used to appoint the highest judicial
offices in the country or those used to nominate persons to the In-
ternational Court of Justice in their state, and nominations must be
accompanied by a declaration of the person's specific qualifications.'
There are two lists of candidates: one with qualifications in criminal
law, the other with qualifications in international law. 2 Nine judges
are to come from the criminal law list and five from the international
" Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia Con-
cerning the Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of
Democratic Kampuchea, June 6, 2003, art. 4(2), available at http://www.dccam.org/Documents
%20and%20Microfilm/UN_&_Cambodian.Agreement.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2004).
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipoten-
tiaries on the Establishment of an Int'l Crim. Ct., U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (1998) [hereinaf-
ter Rome Statute], available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/english/rome_
statute(e).pdf (last modified Jan. 16, 2002).
39 Id. at art. 36(3) (a).
Id. at art. 36(3) (b).
4, Id. at art. 36(4) (a).
12 Id. at art. 36(5).
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law list.43 Election is by secret ballot at a meeting of the state parties
(that is, those that have ratified the Rome Statute).4 The eighteen
candidates who get the highest number of votes with a two-thirds ma-
jority of the states present and voting will become judges. 45 The par-
ties are told to take into account the need for representation of dif-
ferent legal systems, geographical representation, and-for the first
time-gender representation.4 (There is also an expressed desire for
judges with specific experience in violence against women and chil-
dren.) 47 Judges can serve for one nine-year term.48 Article thirty-nine
of the Rome Statute also mandates that in assigning judges to cham-
bers (five to the appellate chamber, six each to the trial and pretrial
chambers) the principal functions of the division shall be aligned
with the experience of the judges, and the trial and pretrial divisions
specifically shall be composed predominantly of judges with criminal
49trial experience.
These details attempt not only to provide for more transparency
in the in-country nomination process, but also to ensure adequate
numbers of judges with criminal trial experience are assigned to the
trial chambers. The first eighteen judges were elected on March 18,
2003, and for the most part appear to fill the qualification require-
ments nicely: seven are women. It took, however, thirty-three voting
rounds to elect the eighteen judges, and at the end there was some
horse-trading among countries as to whose candidate they would
support. But because of the structural nature of the selection process
the horse-trading played a much smaller part than in the earlier tri-
bunals. And there was significant and relatively powerful pressure by
local and international NGOs inside the countries to withdraw some
unsuitable candidates and to nominate more suitable ones. It is fer-
vently hoped that the relative success of the first ICC election round
will pave the way for selection of even more qualified judges across
the board on future international courts. 0 I do want to point out that
43 Id.
" Id. at art. 36(6) (a).
45 Id.
4' Id. at art. 36(8) (a).
41 Id. at art. 36(8)(b).
:8 Id. at art. 36(9) (a).
Id. at art. 39 (1).
As one reporter noted with regard to the newly-established African Court on Human and
Peoples' Rights:
In Africa, the process is progressing at a startling, and worrying, pace. Nominations for
the first bench are due by the end of April, with the aim of holding elections at the Afri-
can Union summit meeting in Addis Ababa startingJuly 5. Past experience teaches that
once the judges have been appointed and the rules of procedure adopted, they are there
to stay-with all their faults and shortcomings. .. . It took more than four years from the
adoption of the Rome Statute to the appointment of the judges of the [ICC], and end-
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there are immense advantages to a multinational bench in being able
to draw on experiences and procedures from different systems for the
solution of common problems. It does take effort to overcome the
logistical problems, and it does require hardworking smart judges.
But in my view the effort is decidedly worthwhile in terms of the re-
sults achieved.
II. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
Issues of judicial independence and accountability dominate cri-
tiques of the American federal judicial system. Total independence
of judges from private party or governmental influence is the para-
digm; and life tenure, guarantees of no diminution of salary, and re-
moval by impeachment only for high crimes and misdemeanors are
the incentives to achieve that ideal. In fact, no federal judge has ever
been removed by impeachment for rendering an unpopular decision,
although the media and politicians regularly level all kinds of scorn-
ful epithets at judges. Instances of judges taking bribes or showing
favoritism to interests in which they have a financial or personal stake
do occur, but such cases have been blessedly rare.
Thus, critiques of the federal bench in recent years have focused
more on accountability than independence, on the seemingly anoma-
lous role of unelected judges in a majoritarian democracy. What
forces-the commentators ask-actually hold judges in line so that
they do not rule on the basis of their personal preferences? The an-
swers proffered are many; among them that our federal courts are
structured in a hierarchical way so that, except for the Supreme
Court, judges' decisions are subject to review and reversal by higher
courts. Congress may pass laws to nullify decisions based on statutory
interpretation or, except in constitutional cases, to take away the
courts' jurisdiction over certain kinds of cases altogether. The press
and academic criticism are powerful tools to make a judge think hard
about her rulings. It is up to the executive branch to enforce most
court decisions of import, and although our history provides only a
few instances where that branch has balked, unpopular decisions in
fact do not lend themselves to speedy and wholehearted implementa-
tion, and no judge wants her decision to die on the vine.I Finally, for
less meetings and travail to establish the tribunal. It required a massive effort both by
the United Nations, several major countries and hundreds of [NGOs] and think tanks.
Cesare P.R. Romano, Justice for Africa, But Only if It's Not Rushed: New African Court, INT'L
HERALD TRIB.,Jan. 27, 2004, at 6.
" See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (stating that the judicial branch "may
truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment; and must ultimately de-
pend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments"); Stephen B.
Burbank & Barry Friedman, Reconsidering Judicial Independence, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT
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the vast majority of federal judges, there is a sincere commitment to
carry out the law, the will of Congress, or the precedents of prior
courts; and if a judge veers too far from either mark, he will likely be
overridden by higher courts or fail to obtain the second vote he
needs on an appellate court. Federal judges are acutely aware that
they are being watched at all times-by the parties, the legislature,
the academics, the press, peers, and ultimately by the populace. And
the judge herself is being judged for her adherence to constitutional
or statutory text, as well as stare decisis-' Most constitutional experts in
the United States now view the judiciary as one part of a "governmen-
tal apparatus 53 which:
provides for an ongoing and often messy political dialogue over our na-
tion's values and ideals. All three branches are granted a voice in that
dialogue and each brings to the table a different perspective .... The
genius of our system is that, through limits on the power of each branch,
54those strengths are pooled.
For U.S. judges there are also a myriad of internal "institutional
rules and norms [that] motivate judges to behave in ways that further
the institutional mission. 55  These include the formidable Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure and Evidence drafted
by advisory committees, which include practitioners, academics, and
judges and which must run the gamut of both the Supreme Court
and Congress before taking effect. Permanently recorded and widely
disseminated opinions also make for responsible judgments, as do
the oral processes of court arguments and the scrutiny of a regular
and alert bar trained in the same legal culture as the judges.
The external and internal dynamics of being a judge on an inter-
national court like the ICTY are quite different in terms of account-
ability. Once selected by the U.N. General Assembly, the judge is not
likely to have much subsequent contact with that body. Although the
United Nations has been publicly impatient with the rate of progress
in trials by both the ICTY and the ICTR, in no way has it expressed
directly or indirectly its desires as to the results in particular cases. It
has no power to pass laws that would undo verdicts or cabin future
THE CROSSROADS, supra note 16, at 9, 20, 25-30 (discussing several influences that play a factor
on howjudges decide opinions).
52 But see Kim Lane Scheppele, Declarations of Independence: Judicial Reactions to Political Pres-
sure, inJUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 16, at 227, 228 ("[N]ew consti-
tutions and expanded conceptions ofjudicial review have given extraordinary powers to judges
to work around the positive law in the name of constitutional principles... [and to] bend [it]
to ajudicial conception of what the law should be .....
Burbank & Friedman, supra note 51, at 15.
Terri Jennings Peretti, Does Judicial Independence Exist, inJUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE
CROSSROADS, supra note 16, at 103, 125.




ones (it cannot by itself enact international law) . In the absence of
any hierarchy of the international courts, there are no higher judicial
posts with which it can reward judges of whom it approves or with-
hold from those of whom it disapproves. Thus, except for its ability
to cut off funds from these tribunals and its control over personnel
serving 5the court, the United Nations exercises little leverage over
judges.
The ICTY statute defines that court's substantive jurisdiction in
fairly cryptic fashion, leaving a fair amount of discretion in the
judges' hands in defining the necessary elements of proof of the cov-
ered crimes. The judges at the ICTY prescribe their own rules. Often
these rules may as critically impact a decision as the statute itself.
Over the years, the rules-amended some thirty times-have added
substantively to such vital issues as witness protection, rights of coun-
sel at various pretrial stages, special rules for cases of sexual violence,
procedures for sentencing, and introduction of new evidence on ap-
peal.5s And the rules can and do change with the perceived needs,
desires, and experiences of the judges. Thus, what was originally a
predominantly adversarial common-law mode of trial has over the
years assimilated many civil law practices, and what was once a largely
permissive judicial attitude toward numbers of witnesses and length
of testimony has now become much more judicially disciplined and
managed. An important pretrial stage has been added to ICTY pro-
ceedings and accommodations made for a fast-growing guilty plea re-
gime. One can question whether the judges themselves should have
such near-absolute power over the rules; by contrast, at the ICC, draft
rules must be adopted by a two-thirds majority of the Assembly of
State Parties, the ratifiers of the Rome Statute setting up the court. 9
International law is law that is accepted in practice by a majority of civilized nations. It
consists of treaties and customary international law-practices accepted as obligatory by a ma-
jority of nations. United Nations resolutions may be evidence of international law but must be
accepted by nations before they can be recognized as constituting international law themselves.
See, e.g., Michael J. Glennon, Sometimes a Great Nation, WILSON Q., Autumn 2003 at 45, 45 ("A
state is not bound by any rule it does not accept."); Jed Rubenfeld, The Two World Orders,
WILSON Q., Autumn 2003, at 22, 31 ("Americans do not quite recognize the UN Charter as
law."); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Leading Through Law, WILSON Q., Autumn 2003, at 37, 37 (defin-
ing international law as "a complex of treaties and customary practices... based in the consent
of states to a specific set of rules that allow them to reap gains from cooperation and thereby
serve their collective interests.").
57 See Betsy Pisik, War-Crimes Tribunals Forced to Borrow Cash, W"ASH. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2003, at
A01 (reporting that U.N. member nations were behind in payments to tribunals, requiring
them to dip into U.N. peacekeeping accounts to sustain their prosecutions, and that diplomats
expressed frustration with the slow pace of trials).
See ICTY R. P. & EVID. (evidencing more than thirty revisions since their original adop-
tion), http://www.un.org/icty/basic/rpe/IT32_rev32.htm (last revised Aug. 12, 2004).
" Rome Statute, supra note 38, at art. 51.
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In the United States, federal judges must realistically take account
of the possibility of congressional action that may nullify their rulings,
and the rulings themselves are in large part based on interpretation
of the laws Congress passed (albeit filtered through executive agency
first-cut interpretations under the rule of Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc.60). There is no counterpart to this law-
giving and law-interpreting relationship for international judges;
there is no international legislature. The judges' rulings are based on
something called "international law"-which is itself a compendium
of treaties, customs, practices, and declarations along with a fairly
sparse collection of national and international tribunal applications;'
none of the latter is by itself authoritative as there is no hierarchy of
international courts. Thus, international courts can and sometimes
do differ in their interpretations of the same treaty language and as
to what qualifies as customary international law.62 If they err, there is
no one except an appellate panel of their own court or an acute
journalist or academic commentator to complain (usually months or
years later). And the public reaction to their decision-if it exists at
all-may well differ from country to country as well as from group to
group. All of this makes for less theoretical accountability than our
U.S. judges have, and candidly, it also means that international tribu-
nals typically have more leeway than our domestic courts today enjoy
in making their judgments as to what the law says or requires.
Here, however, we need to remember that international courts
are a relatively new phenomenon on the scene. If we look back at the
early history of our own federal judiciary over two hundred years ago,
under the very activist Chief Justice John Marshall, before there were
thousands of precedents to follow and before principles of federalism
or court/congressional relationships were developed, I suspect we
will find the same judicial innovations, surprises, leaps of faith, and
adventuresome reasoning that international judges today must often
engage in to create a jurisprudential body of law. With time, experi-
ence, and constructive criticism, we can expect a culling of the best
judgments which, while they can never be compulsorily imposed on
other courts, can be very persuasive.
467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (holding that the Court must construe an ambiguous statute in
accordance with a permissible executive agency interpretation).
61 See supra note 56.
62 See Thomas Buergenthal, Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals: Is It Good or
Bad?, 14 LEIDENJ. INT'L L., 267, 272 (2001) ("[T]he jurisprudence of the different international
tribunals can ... lead to the development of conflicting or mutually exclusive legal doctrines,
and thus eventually threaten the universality of international law."); Jonathan I. Charney, Is In-
ternational Law Threatened By Multiple International Tribunals?, 271 RECUEIL DES COORS 134




But it must be admitted, as I mentioned before, that even for the
most conscientious international judge bent on finding and following
existing international law, there are logistical problems. True,
American judges must often flesh out, elaborate on, or fill the inter-
stices of statutory law and extend or cut back on prior precedents, but
they start out with a robust host of sources, embedded in authorita-
tive books neatly stacked in library shelves or on computer disks. In
ternational judges have a tougher time of it. At the ICTY, as in other
international courts, there is a basic charter or statute, usually just a
few pages in length, setting out the temporal and geographical juris-
diction of the court (crimes committed on the territory of the former
Yugoslavia after January 1, 1991).64 The earlier international criminal
courts were typically given fairly laconic definitions of war crimes
(crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Convention,
and genocide) to apply to a wide array of different fact scenarios. It
should be noted, however, that these definitions have expanded and
proliferated in the century since the original Hague and Geneva
Conventions and the Nuremberg Charter. They now encompass ex-
plicit gender crimes against women, including rape and sexual slav-
ery, and new crimes against humanity, such as disappearances from
the Argentine and apartheid from the South African experiences.
65
And each successive international court has tended to define the
categories of war crimes and crimes against humanity with new com-
ponents or variations (even the United States, in publishing its own
elements of crimes for the military tribunals to be held in Guan-
tanamo, has added new elements it claims are justified by customary
law) .66 The ICC now has the most elaborate and comprehensive defi-
nitions which, before our withdrawal, had been drafted and exten-
sively critiqued with the help of our own Pentagon officials, though
administration critics of the ICC now ironically complain that they are
67too vague or too susceptible to subjective interpretation. But the
63 Burbank & Friedman, supra note 51, at 24("[T]here is leeway in the law and because
judges are human, some decisions will depend in part on who sits on the bench."); Linn Ham-
mergren, Judicial Independence and Judicial Accountability: The Shifting Balance in Reform Goals, in
GUIDANCE, supra note 16, at 149 (noting widespread "concern that judges' ability to interpret
laws as they apply them may give them excessive power in reshaping the legal framework ac-
cording to values and views shared neither by the public nor by the other branches of govern-
ment").
See ICTY Statute, supra note 5, at art. 1.
See Rome Statute, supra note 38, at art. 7 (defining "crimes against humanity").
See MILITARY COMMISSION INSTRUCTIONS SOURCEBOOK 9-105 (Nat'l Inst. of Military Jus-
tice 2003) (reprinting the original draft of Military Commission Instruction 1 defining crimes
and their elements, commentaries submitted to the Commission by numerous interested par-
ties, and the final text of the Instruction).
6'7 See Bruce Fein, Commentary, Torching the Constitution, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2000, at A18
("The criminal jurisdiction of the tribunal is frightening because it is vulnerable to political
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bottom line is that in the absence of a universal legislature to define
crimes and punishments, the series of disparate international courts
located in far-distant places and largely unsupervised over extended
periods of time must develop what is basically an international com-
mon law of criminal responsibility.
At a practical level, parsing international law to ascertain if ajuris-
dictional crime has been committed is not like going to the U.S.
Code, the Supreme Court Reports, or F.3d for answers. Until Nur-
emberg, no national or international court had ever defined, let
alone applied this concept of International Humanitarian Law
("IHL"), to individual criminal defendants. Ironically, only military
courts-martial and commissions had done so. The Nuremberg court
relied on military precedent for the legitimacy of holding the Nazi
leaders individually guilty for their wartime atrocities.
Just locating sources of IHL is an elusive job, especially the deter-
mination of whether particular treatises, diplomatic documents, local
cases, or even treaties ratified by some but not all nations constitute
evidence of customary international law. Some authorities go so far
as to say that there is no "international law" at all; most agree that the
boundaries are cloudy at the edges. Databases on IHL are still in the
developmental stages; many potential sources of IHL have not even
been translated into major languages (for instance, it was only a few
years ago that the annals of the World War II Tokyo Trials were fi-
nally translated into English). While I was at the ICTY we had only a
rudimentary library; legal assistants regularly queried each other as to
where sources of IHL might be in their respective countries' juris-
prudence and then informally translated them into one of the ICTY's
operating languages-French, English, or Serbo-Croatian. But, as
time goes on, many of these logistical and research problems can and
are being solved with a little money and willpower. The exact dimen-
sions of international law by its very nature will never be discernible
in the same way as domestic law, but as international court applica-
tions grow and interact, we can confidently expect an increasing
number of agreed-upon principles and applications to emerge. The
only alternative is to abandon international law altogether as a gov-
erning and controlling source of criminal law. There are indeed
some who advocate that course, but it is surely not the right one for a
rule-of-law democracy such as ours to adopt or advocate.
Another more practical but just as important shortcoming in in-
ternational courts' relationship with their host governments is the in-
ability to obtain enforcement of their orders. American judges can
depend on the national executive (or state officials in most cases) to




enforce their judgments, however unpopular. The international
court has no enforcer. It is dependent on the good will of national
governments to apprehend indictees and to hand over vital evidence
or witnesses (except within the Dayton Accords confederation where
NATO's Stabilisation Force (SFOR) is empowered to arrest ICTY ac-
cuseds,6 but performs erratically). Although the ICTY charter man-
dates cooperation from all U.N. members, the degree of that coop-
eration has fluctuated radically depending on the politics of the
country. In Serbia, there was no cooperation under Milosevic, then a
degree with the initial successor regimes, and it is now deteriorating
again with the rise of nationalists to power. In Croatia, similarly, co-
operation was nonexistent with Tujman, good with his successor,
Mesic, and is now at risk under a new nationalist government. Need-
less to say, the judges on an international court have no leverage over
sovereign governments to compel enforcement of their orders, and
complaints to the Security Council rarely produce results.69
On the other hand, international courts do on occasion come un-
der intense pressure from national governments when a particular
decision gores a powerful local ox. In one case, the government of
Rwanda threatened total boycott of the ICTR because of an unpopu-
lar decision freeing a defendant held too long without trial. In an-
other, SFOR's arrests of indicted suspects in the Balkans dropped
from one a month to none for several months when the trial court
ordered NATO countries to report on how a named indictee had
been captured. In the former case, the court reversed its ruling on
the basis of self-labeled "new facts," a result skeptically viewed not sur-
prising by some. In the latter, the prosecutor settled on a lesser
charge and the defendant withdrew his original motion on which the
court had acted.0
In such situations, the court has no popular constituency to in-
voke-international experts or the media may side with it, but only by
happenstance; few feel their long-term interests are bound up with
the court as an institution the way many interest groups in the United
States do, as they rise quickly to the court's defense. In turn, the in-
See S.C. Res. 1088, U.N. SCOR, 51st Sess., 3723rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1088 (1996)
(authorizing SFOR to implement the military aspects of the Dayton Accords).
69 See Thomas Henquet, Mandatory Compliance Powers vis-t-vis States by the Ad Hoc Tribunals
and the International Criminal Court: A Comparative Analysis, 12 LEIDEN J. INT'L L., 969, 969-99
(1999) (describing the lack of control the tribunals have when dealing with the national laws of
the countries in which they are located).
71 See Prosecutor v. Simic, 2000 I.C.T.Y. IT-95-9 (holding that the North Atlantic Council
shall provide the defense with all documents and recordings in relation to the capture of Stevan
Todorovic); J. Coil Metcalfe, An Interview with United Nations' Chief War Crimes Prosecutor Carla Del
Ponte, INTERNEWS REPs., Feb. 15, 2000 (questioning Ponte's reaction to the release of the Jean-
Bosco Barayagwiza due to prosecutorial mishandling), at http://www.internews.org/activities/
ICTR reports/ICTRDelPonte.htm.
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ternational courts find it hard to decipher the "mood" of the affected
populations the way American courts sense the temper of the people
and factor it into their decisions.7' The end result is that informal,
even ephemeral constraints on, or sources of support for, national
judges are missing in the international scene. For example, it would
be unheard of for the Congress to threaten to cut off all funds for the
courts because they were no longer worth the investment as the
United Nations appears now to be doing with respect to the ICTY and
ICTR.
In sum, then, international courts-at least the ICTY species-do
not function as the third branch of a constitutional triumvirate in
which checks and balances limit their independence somewhat but
also provide important support for the legitimacy of their decisions.
Nor do they have the at-hand access to popular opinion that Ameri-
can judges do. In some ways they may appear to be less accountable
than their American counterparts both because there is no hierarchi-
cal structure for external review of their decisions, and because they
have no dynamic relations with other branches of government. The
"law" they apply is itself more diffuse and less developed than any
single country's jurisprudence. In the area ofjudicial behavior, there
was no Code of Ethics during my tenure at the ICTY (though the
ICC's Rome Statute and Rules do contain the core of such a code 7 2 ),
and there was no mechanism for disciplining judges, although in
theory the Security Council might have removed a judge for cause.
(Again, it is good to relate, the ICC has progressed to a definite pro-
cedure for removal of judges and for their discipline for less serious
offenses.73) Again, an example of how successive international courts,
even in the short period of a decade, have taken "lessons learned"
from earlier courts to heart.
III. RELATIONSHIPS AMONG THE COURT PLAYERS
In the final analysis, it is usually the talents, character, and dedica-
tion of the judges themselves that ultimately determine the reputa-
tion of a court. This is true of an international court as well as a na-
tional one, though the obstacles to be overcome in a multinational
7' GUIDANCE, supra note 16, at 2-3 ("A society's expectations of its judiciary play a critical
role in fostering independence.. ").
71 See Rome Statute, supra note 38, at art. 40(2) (prohibiting judges from engaging in activities
"likely to interfere with their judicial functions or to affect confidence in their independence").
71 See id. at art. 41 (governing the excusing and disqualification ofjudges); id. at art. 46 (re-
quiring removal from office under certain circumstances); id. at art. 47 (prescribing disciplinary
measures for lesser offenses); see also ICTY R. P. & EVID., supra note 58, at 24-25, 29, 32, 34 (de-
fining the scope of procedural rules for the internal workings of the tribunal).
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court are inherently greater. Telford Taylor wrote about Nurem-
berg's judges:
[D]espite the members' disagreements and profound differences, they
were bent on bringing their enterprise to a successful conclusion. In
conference, opinions were forcefully stated, but all realized that in some
situations personal opinions must be suppressed in order to reach a vo-
table conclusion. Nikitchenko [the Russian judge, formerly a Soviet
prosecutor] was well aware of this necessity, and his dissenting opinion
was not savagely written.
74
My former colleague on the D.C. Circuit, Judge Harry Edwards,
has written that collegiality is the essential ingredient of a well-
functioning court, the genuine willingness of each judge to listen to
and take others' views into account. Hard cases make tense col-
leagues, and a yearning for the respect, even the sporadic affection of
one's fellow judges, counts for something, often a great deal, in push-
ing judges toward common solutions. The isolation of the court's
inward workings from direct outside pressures and influence inevita-
bly means that one's colleagues, their approval or disapproval, come
to play an important role in ajudge's life.
Getting to collegiality, as Judge Edwards defines it, is harder on an
international court. It is obviously more difficult for judges who do
not speak each other's language or come from each other's legal cul-
ture to engage in the kind of thoughtful discourse and exchange of
views that breeds collegiality. I found exchanges among judges at the
ICTY to be relatively formalistic; the tug and pull discussions I was
14 TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 631.
7' Edwards, supra note 55, at 1644-45.
76 As one former judge wrote:
There is intimacy, continuity, and dynamism in the relations among judges .... They
interact with each other, influence each other, and have each other in mind almost from
the time they first read briefs for the next session of court. In a sense, the relationship
among judges who differ in their values and views is a bargaining one, yet it is a continu-
ing negotiation, where each player lays his cards on the table just as soon as he discovers
what cards he has.
FRANK M. COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A JUDGE: REFLECTIONS FROM THE FEDERAL APPELLATE BENCH
58-59 (1980); see also FRANK M. COFFIN, ONAPPEAL: COURTS, LAWYERING, ANDJUDGING 213, 216
(1994) (focusing on how appellate judges are collegial when in small numbers, but noting how
collegiality is threatened as the appellate courts grow larger); Patricia M. Wald, Calendars, Colle-
giality, and Other Intangibles on the Courts of Appeals, in THE FEDERAL APPELLATE JUDICIARY IN THE
21ST CENTURY 171, 178-82 (Cynthia Harrison & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1989) ("Only the grim
reaper or retirement can free [judges] from each other. Personal relationships between the
judges can play a crucial role in appellate court operations. [Wihen precedents are absent or
ambiguous, personalities, predilections, and group relations rush in to help fill the void.");
Douglas H. Ginsburg & Donald Falk, The Court En Banc: 1981-1990, The D.C. Circuit Review, Sep-
tember 19 89-August 1990, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1008, 1017 (1991) ("[O]n the court the con-
currence of a colleague is the coin of the realm."); Deanell Reece Tacha, The "C" Word: On Col-
legiality, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 585, 586 (1995) ("I... believe that there is a value in collegiality that
affects the quality ofjudicial decisionmaking.").
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used to at the D.C. Circuit were more often held with or among the
legal assistants rather than the judges. Civil law judges in general
were not as easily inclined to discuss their reasons for going one way
or another as I was used to at home.77 And although dissents and
separate opinions were allowed at the ICTY, with few exceptions they
did not provide the same spirited exchanges that characterized the
opinions of my former court.
While judges on the two permanent international courts, the ICC
and the International Court of Justice ("ICJ"), have nine-year terms,
tenures of judges on ad hoc specialized international courts like the
ICTY are typically brief. Thus, most of these short-term judges typi-
cally have less time to grow into their roles than we do at home, or to
develop over time and by trial and error a full-blown judicial person-
ality or philosophy; they must draw immediately and throughout
their term on the intellectual and temperamental capital gleaned
from their former lives and jobs. The cluster of seasoned veterans
Judge Edwards talked about as the core of a stable collegial court is
rarer on an ad hoc international court. In my experience judges at
the ICTY were pleasant, always civil, though sometimes a bit remote;
inevitably-as at home-only a few formed close friendships. Under-
standably, all these factors incline a judge on one of these temporary
courts to feel and act more as an individual than as part of an institu-
tion with a history, a future, and an integral relationship with other
institutions of government. And realistically this part of the interna-
tional judge's career will not likely affect his future in the same way
an at-home judgeship will. It is a bit like taking a sabbatical-it does
not count for much in the career calculus. His relationships with
otherjudges are not a lifetime preoccupation.
Many, if not most, multinational courts will combine civil law and
common law judges, and the rules of procedure as well will feature a
mix of both systems,78 which themselves often reflect basic differences
in the concept of what ajudge should do and what kind of role in the
trial she should play. These variations in turn affect the ability of
77 See Hammergren, supra note 63, at 152 ("Cultures which still privilege traditional author-
ity may be less inclined to demand transparency from theirjudges. In the civil law tradition, the
persistent belief that judges only apply the law may also diminish the demand.); see also HERMAN
SCHWARTZ, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE 246
(2000) (urging new constitutional court judges to reject the "tendency to issue terse opin-
ions... without full explanation" and the "archaic Civil Law notion that the law is fixed, clear,
and discernible, and that all that judges do is discover and apply it," calling that notion "non-
sense").
"' See Patricia M. Wald, Rules of Evidence in the Yugoslav War Tibunal, 21 QUINNIPIAC L. REV.
761 (2003) (noting the difficulties in applying rules of evidence and procedure in international
courts composed of both civil and common lawjudges).
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judges to appreciate opposing points of view and to interact construc-
tively.
A civil law proceeding generally features an investigative judge
who directs the investigation, questions witnesses, evaluates docu-
ments, and decides whether a trial is warranted. 79 His dossier be-
comes the focus of the trial, and he or a replacementjudge is likely to
do most of the questioning. Our trials place the judge in the role of
an umpire with prosecution and defense putting on their own evi-
dence and trying to break down the other's and the judge (or jury)
deciding if the prosecution has carried the burden beyond a reason-
able doubt. While the judge may ask questions, he is not the central
interlocutor and may indeed be reversed if he asks too many. The
ICTY rules, which basically follow a common law adversarial mode of
trial, but with a number of civil-law-based innovations, do permit
judges to ask questions-and they ask them regularly-though usu-
ally at the end of the direct and cross. They may also call their own
witnesses, which is done with some frequency, though with some
risk. In the trial of the Serbrenica massacres, the judges called two
former Bosnian Muslim generals when the prosecution had failed to
do so, and their testimony appeared to be relevant. After the guilty
judgment was handed down, the prosecutor announced both gener-
als were being indicted for separate war crimes arising out of other
incidents-a circumstance unbeknownst to the judges beforehand.
The primacy of the judge's role in a civil law mode of trial, how-
ever, reinforces a view of the judge as inherently endowed with supe-
rior faculties that (1) allow him to evaluate evidence without the kind
of credibility constraints our common law system imposes on admis-
sibility, and (2) do not require from him the fully reasoned explana-
tion of decisions that we are accustomed to. Both of these notions re-
flect basic judging philosophies that do not always easily merge or
give way.
A prominent example of this is the use of written testimony to
supplement or supplant live witnesses which has from the beginning
been controversial at the ICTY. Our Federal Rules of Evidence em-
body the basic bar against hearsay evidence along with the several ex-
ceptions that have been recognized by the courts over the years.81
The concept that an accused has the right to demand his accusers
7, Id. at 764 ("The ICTY uses basically an adversarial mode of trial. That is, the independent
prosecutor brings an indictment to be confirmed by one of the trial judges-assigned by rota-
tion.").
See ICTY R. P. & EviD., supra note 58, at 85(A) ("Each party is entitled to call witnesses and
present evidence.").
81 See FED. R. EvID. art. VIII, advisory comm. notes (proposed rules 1972) (listing "three
conditions under which witnesses ideally will testify: (1) under oath, (2) in the personal pres-
ence of the trier of fact, (3) subject to cross-examination").
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testify in person and subject themselves to cross-examination and to
an evaluation of their demeanor by the judges remains, however, fun-
damental, as we have been reminded this very term by the Supreme
Court.12 Although the ICTY rules initially stated a clear preference
for live testimony, they have always contained more liberal allowances
for depositions, video testimony, transcripts of prior testimony, and
judicial notice of "adjudicated facts" than our own; still, while I was
there, ICTY appeals chambers decisions insisted that written docu-
ments evidence some indicia of credibility and reliability, rejecting,
for example, admission of an unsworn, un-cross-examined statement
of a witness to a field investigator. In recent years, however, the rules
have been liberalized to allow admission of written witness statements
so long as they do not go to the core of the challenged conduct or
role of the accused, 3 and the latest decisions have permitted written
witness statements to be introduced across-the-board so long as the
witness is held available on request for crossexamination (eliciting, I
note, a blistering dissent from one of the Tribunal's most able appel-
late judges-predictably from a common lawjurisdiction) .4
When I have asked civil law judges about the greater receptivity to
written testimony, they say that the American system requires oral tes-
timony because of untrained lay juries' need to see and hear wit-
nesses. This kind of one-on-one exposure is not thought necessary
for professional jurists who, it is postulated, have the skill and train-
ing to evaluate the worth of a written statement and to give it what
credence it deserves. This was hard for me to accept. I thought it
evident that we could not tell from a written statement whether a wit-
ness is truthful unless her testimony was so inherently incredible or so
contradictory as to be unbelievable. And I saw too many witnesses on
the stand change their stories from prior written statements in ways
big and small, not from perjurious motive but from having faulty
" See Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004) (holding that out-of-court testimonial
statements by witnesses may not be introduced at trial, under the Confrontation Clause, unless
the witnesses are unavailable and the defendants had a prior opportunity to cross-examine
them, regardless of whether such statements are deemed reliable by the court).
8 See Patricia M. Wald, To "Establish Incredible Events by Credible Evidence". The Use of Affidavit
Testimony in Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal Proceedings, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 537 (2001) ("[T] he
ICTY has been moving... toward a trial mode in which written testimony will play a far more
significant role than in past ICTY prosecutions or in our own American system.").
" AsJudge David Hunt saw it:
The only reasonable explanation for these decisions appears to be a desire to assist the
prosecution to bring the Completion Strategy to a speedy conclusion. I have been un-
able to agree with those decisions because I do not believe that, in doing so, I would be
performing my duties "honourably, faithfully, impartially and conscientiously" as the sol-
emn declaration which I took when I became ajudge of the Tribunal requires me to do.
Prosecutor v. Milosevic, 2003 I.C.T.Y. No. IT-02-54-AR73.4 (Hunt, J., dissenting) (footnote omit-
ted), available at http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/appeal/decision-e/031021diss.htm (last
visited Sept. 17, 2004).
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memories. Thus, with many witnesses the truth only surfaced
through persistent probing. In my view then, the reversion to written
evidence, incremental though it was, was a far more troubling trend
in individual applications than it was to my civil law colleagues.
The idea of the judge as specially endowed carries through in
other parts of civil law jurisprudence. The system has clung longer
than ours to the notion that judges find law, not make it. It also ap-
pears in the sometimes initial avoidance of reasoning in detail. The
template for judgments at the ICTY, especially in the early years, was
sometimes a lengthy statement of facts, hornbook expositions of the
law, and then judgment with scant analysis in between as to how the
law was applied to the facts-ironically, a result much like our jury
verdicts. Over time, however, the bureaucratic style of the earlier
ICTYjudgments has been replaced by more reader-accessible discus-
sions of the issues; this comes, I think, from the court's increasing ad-
justment to the bright light of transparency and from its own matura-
tion and the interaction of its judges from both systems. ICTY
opinions continue to be excessively long, however, exposing the
committee product they sometimes are. The decisions themselves,
unfortunately, are not reproduced in any permanent hard-copy form
like our federal reporter system; they are available only unbound and
online. My guess is that few outside of international law scholars and
practitioners get around to reading them.
All judgments are per curiam (though, as I have said, dissents and
separate statements are permitted), and perhaps an individual judge,
uncredited, may be less motivated to pour his heart and soul into his
work product. As a result, some judges write their own opinions; oth-
ers delegate the task largely to staff assistants and limit their review to
the final drafts. But that is not entirely unlike how the process works
in some of our own appellate courts with which I am familiar.
I have held for last what is probably the most critical difference
between judging here and abroad-the simple but profound effect of
language differences. It does affect the process of judging at every
stage. The ICTY courtrooms are supplied with first-rate translators
who provide the judges with instantaneous translations through high-
tech audio, supplemented by close-captioned television monitors in
English, French, or Serbo-Croat-the native language of most defen-
dants, witnesses, and many defense counsel. In our chamber, the
presiding judge spoke in French; I spoke in English with limited
French; the third judge alternated between the two. Typically, the
85 See Patricia M. Wald, Dealing with Witnesses in War Crime Trials: Lessons from the Yugoslav Tri-
bunal, 5 YALE HUM. RTs. & DEV. L.J. 217, 227-29 (2002) ("[T]he story a witness tells on the stand
very frequently differs in major or minor details from the one in the witness statement given
years before.").
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prosecution asked a question in English, pausing while it was trans-
lated to the witness in Serbo-Croat, whose answer in Serbo-Croat was
translated into both French and English for the court and prosecu-
tion. There is no question that the process slowed down trial pro-
ceedings measurably (some estimates are by fifty percent). Transla-
tion disputes frequently arose. And, if the judges had to huddle
together to make a ruling on some procedural matter, we usually did
so in vaguely imperfect English with asides in French.
In chambers deliberations-again without translators-it was per-
ceptibly more difficult to debate or argue; there was first the problem
of finding the counterpart words in the other language for what you
wanted to say, but, perhaps more basically, there was the problem of
finding the contextual analog in a different legal system for the pro-
cedure or the concept that you want to discuss-which in the end
might not even exist outside your own system. Both interim and final
decisions at the ICTY had to be issued in both English and French,
but only one was the authoritative version. In my own case, if it were
drafted in French, it would have to await my approval until translated
into English (reportedly, some judges were willing to sign on to a
document in a different language on faith, but I was not). Often my
colleagues blinked first and were willing to approve a final version in
English after our legal assistants mediated the discussion in both lan-
guages.
Language vexed elsewhere in the process, as well. Accuseds had
to be provided discovery, documents in their own language-Serbo-
Croat-which, if derived from English or French, took extra time.
And at the core of the process I found it a vastly more difficult job to
evaluate a witness' demeanor and credibility when I did not under-
stand directly what she was saying, but heard her speak only through
the translator's voice and idiom.
Other courtroom relationships bore the brunt of language differ-
ences. Defense counsel came from all over the world, often drawn by
salaries higher than at home; many were not familiar with the adver-
sarial mode of trial and maladroit at cross-examination, thereby pro-
longing the process. Although all counsel were supposed to have flu-
ency in either English or French, the requirement was often waived
for Balkan counsel because their clients insisted on a native speaker.
The result was that questioning witnesses often proceeded in a slow
and awkward fashion and the crackling give-and-take of crossexami-
nation as we know it in the American courtroom was impossible.
Briefs written by counsel who were not really comfortable with the
operating language-French or English-proved hard to follow, and
the judge often had to work overtime even to understand the argu-
ment that he had to evaluate. The prosecutors on the other hand




There were non-language impediments to a swiftly moving trial as
well. For obvious reasons, a large percentage of witnesses-especially
survivors or victims-testify under fairly elaborate protective measures
ranging from pseudonyms or gag orders on mention of their names
to anyone outside the defense team to voice and face distortions (the
proceedings are routinely televised into the Balkans) .6 Witnesses are
often subject to intimidation in their home villages, and reliving their
wartime experiences are tortuous for them, so the emotional atmos-
phere in the courtroom is high. There are many joint trials involving
a half-dozen accused individuals and more than a dozen counsel
along with the security guards, the court deputies, the translators,
and the legal assistants, resulting in a crowded scene, not always con-
ducive to a smoothly running trial. Witness outbursts are fairly com-
mon, as are barbed exchanges between defense counsel and prosecu-
tors. All of this and the overlay of everyone listening to the
proceedings through headphones in one of three different languages
means the level of concentration required from a judge to stay with it
six hours a day, five days a week for months at a time is hugely de-
manding. Judges, moreover, are aware that there are many powerful
NGOs rooting for convictions, watchful of any real or perceived mis-
treatment of victims and, since capital punishment is unavailable,
critical of sentences short of life imprisonment. Ironically, the same
groups that worry about defendants' rights at home tend to worry
primarily about prosecution witnesses' rights in international trials.
The trial culminates in the majority of cases in a finding of guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt which, ironically, can be found on a 2-1
decision, followed by sentencing, where linguistic and cultural differ-
ences persist. The ICTY has minimal sentencing guidelines other
than the ban on capital punishment. The judges are told to take ac-
count of sentences in the former Yugoslavia, but after the abolition of
87the death penalty there, the upper limit was forty years. Gravity of
the crime and mitigating and aggravating circumstances are fre-
quently cited, but there is no sentencing tariff or ranges for particular
crimes or categories of crimes. Informally, judges do think about sav-
ing the highest sentence-life-for the worst criminals, some of
86 See id. at 221-25 ("The Tribunal has a very active Victims and Witnesses Section (VWS) in
its Registry... created to support and protect all witnesses, whether called by the prosecution,
the defense, or the Court.").
17 See ICTY Statute, supra note 5, at art. 24, ("The penalty imposed'by the Trial Chamber shall
be limited to imprisonment. In determining the terms of imprisonment, the Trial Chambers
shall have recourse to the general practice regarding prison sentences in the courts of the for-
mer Yugoslavia."); Patricia M. Wald, General Radislav Krstic: A War Crimes Case Study, 16 GEO. J.
OF LEGAL ETHICS 445, 467 (2003) ("[T]he Bosnian Code in 1998 abolished the death penalty
and set twenty to forty years as the range for long-term imprisonment 'for the gravest forms of
criminal offenses."') (footnote omitted).
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whom have not yet been apprehended. But the judge's own cultural
background inevitably factors into what she thinks is a severe or leni-
ent sentence. I am no fan of our federal sentencing guidelines, but I
do think some form of presumptive range for certain categories of
crime would give a more uniform face to the process. This is espe-
cially important now as the Tribunal is accepting more and more
guilty pleas to reduced charges in an attempt to clean up its docket by
its sunset date of 2008.8 Sentences are served in "neutral" countries
with whom the ICTY has made arrangements-some, like Sweden,
have felicitous surroundings that have inspired critics to chastise the
Tribunal as not punitive enough. But they are all far removed from
the prisoners' homeland and families, and the likelihood of hearing
their own language spoken is minimal.
What can be done to ease the language burden? American stu-
dents, especially those contemplating work abroad, should get train-
ing in foreign languages earlier and more urgently. Desirably, judges
should be fluent in both working languages of an international tri-
bunal; at least one of the principal defense lawyers should be as well.
Ideally, international tribunals would do business in one language
except, of course, for accused individuals and witnesses. Diversity is
much to be desired in the personnel of international courts, but it
must be melded with the capability to run a criminal trial with opti-
mum efficiency and fairness.
CONCLUSION
In the United States we worry about judges' independence and
accountability. We want our judges to be independent of all political
influences and personal loyalties in their judgments, but to be re-
sponsive to the will of Congress in reading statutes, to defer to execu-
tive agencies' interpretations, and to at least recognize and weigh
popular attitudes and moods (where they do not interfere with con-
stitutional rights or guarantees). We expect them to follow prior ju-
dicial precedents of their own and higher courts, and we expect them
to exert restraining influences on each other through peer pressure
and collegiality. Our judges know that they are one-third of an inter-
active constitutional scheme. In most cases, the system works to pro-
duce judges with both independence and sensitivity to the total envi-
ronment in which they function.
See Geoffrey R. Watson, The Changing Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 871, 882 (2003) ("[T]he ICTY slowly has come to
embrace plea-bargaining as a necessary component of a court with a heavy workload and a
complex body of governing law.").
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International judges operate in a different milieu. There is no
executive or legislative body to which they must defer. There is no
body of precedent they must adhere to-except the appeals panel of
their own court. The law they administer is hard to pin down, dif-
fused through treaties, customs, declarations, and a small corpus of
decisions around the globe. Judicial collegiality is hard to develop
when judges do not speak the same language or are not drawn from
similar legal cultures. These impediments are exacerbated when
tenure is brief. A judge's performance on an international court-
shrouded as it is in the anonymity of per curiam decisions-usually
has little bearing on his career when he returns to his native country.
Selection of international judges is a vexing process. Up to now-
with the possible exception of the International Criminal Court-
selections have been largely unregulated, and decisions among com-
peting nations' candidates have often been made on tradeoffs not
relevant to individual merit. Hopefully, and we are seeing encourag-
ing signs that this is happening, as international courts multiply and
the critical nature of their decisions becomes more evident, nominat-
ing nations will exercise greater care. But the appointing authority,
whether the United Nations, Assembly of States Parties, or the inter-
national or regional court itself, ought to have power to examine the
qualifications of the candidates themselves and to set minimal crite-
ria, including courtroom practice for trial court candidates and lin-
guistic facility. Whenever possible, tenure should be longer than four
to five years so that a court can develop an integrated working rou-
tine and a coherent body of jurisprudence over a period of time. In-
ternational court judgments must be subjected to pervasive academic
and professional critiques. Many of our international experts, sympa-
thetic to the tribunals' birth pangs perhaps, have bent over backwards
not to be too critical, but in a system where there is no binding au-
thority among tribunals, judgments can persuade only on their mer-
its, and they often need mature criticism to perceive errors or alter-
natives.
International judges need regularized opportunities to discuss
problems and techniques with each other. For example, a more can-
did, face-to-face exchange of views and experiences among tribunals
on subjects such as written versus live testimony, witness protection,
and enforcement of orders would be beneficial. Ideally, the interna-
tional judge should consider herself not simply the representative of
her own country, but also a member of a corps ofjudges implement-
ing the common law of a community of civilized nations. But as of
now, the only source of pressure on most international courts is likely
to come from the judge's home country when that country's interests
are at stake in the court. This source of pressure should be mini-
mized by education, longer terms, admonitions from the court's
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leadership to national authorities, and ultimately by a code of ethics
for international judges that transcends national influence.
International judges themselves must show diligence, sophistica-
tion in international law, familiarity with courtroom procedures, and
linguistic diversity. Ad hoc efforts of training that now exist for new
judges need to be dramatically upgraded. Service as an international
judge can be isolating and lonely--in my experience much more so
than for national judges-but it also offers an exhilarating opportu-
nity to move justice forward on an international stage. We must-
and can-do more to create an atmosphere in which the best, the
brightest, and the most creative and productive of our national
judges will be drawn to that service. The fairness and even the effi-
ciency in the process in these international courts is advancing with
experience; the language impediments may not disappear, but they
can be mitigated and compensated for, and in the end the growing
pains and deficiencies of these path-breaking courts should not ob-
scure their major achievements in bringing to justice for the first time
in history some of the most terrible predators against the innocent
victims of war and tyranny.
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